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Detecting ambiguity is essential for successful communication. Two studies 
investigated whether preschool- (4- to 5-year-old) and school-age (6- to 7-year-old) 
children show sensitivity to communicative ambiguity and can use this cue to determine 
which speakers constitute valuable informational sources. Children were provided clues 
to the location of hidden dots by speakers who varied in clarity and accuracy. 
Subsequently, children decided from whom they would like to receive additional 
information. In Study 1, preschool- (n=40) and school-age (n=42) children preferred to 
solicit information from unambiguous than from ambiguous speakers. However, 
ambiguous speakers were preferred to speakers who provided inaccurate information. In 
Study 2, when not provided with information about the outcome of the speakers’ clues, 
school-age (n=22), but not preschool-age (n=19), children preferred unambiguous 
relative to ambiguous speakers. Results highlight a developmental progression in 
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Children are faced with an abundance of information on a daily basis, with much 
of this information in the form of verbal testimony from other individuals. There are a 
number of cues children rely on to determine the credibility of such informational 
sources. In particular, children will more readily accept information from speakers who 
have demonstrated themselves to be knowledgeable (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2002; Koenig, 
Clement & Harris, 2004). However, knowledge alone is not a sufficient criterion for 
deeming someone to be a valuable informational source. Rather, an optimal informant 
should also possess the ability to convey his/her knowledge in a way that is accessible 
and clear to others. For example, when asking for travel directions, an informant’s 
knowledge of the area becomes irrelevant if the information is not provided in an 
unambiguous fashion. To maximize communicative success, children would benefit from 
detecting speakers’ clarity and using this information when deciding from whom to 
solicit information. The present study investigated whether preschool- and school-age 
children use communicative clarity as a cue to evaluate informational sources. 
 Attending to the characteristics of potential informational sources enables 
listeners to acquire information more efficiently and effectively. For example, even 
though children encode information from both reliable and unreliable sources, they only 
form semantic representations based on information from reliable sources (Sabbagh & 
Shafman, 2009). A typical paradigm used to investigate the characteristics children attend 
to when determining speaker credibility involves presenting children with conflicting 
testimony from two individuals (e.g., different labels for novel objects). Then, children’s 
adoption or application of the information is assessed to determine on which informant 
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the children relied (e.g., which label was mapped to the novel object; e.g., Birch, 
Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig et al., 2004; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig & Harris, 
2007).  In this way, children’s preference for particular informant characteristics can be 
inferred.  Using this (or similar) methodology, a number of characteristics affecting 
children’s judgments of informant reliability have been determined. For example, 
children prefer to learn from speakers who are familiar (Corriveau & Harris, 2009), are 
adults (as opposed to children; Jaswal & Neely, 2006), are non-dissenting (Corriveau, 
Fusaro, & Harris, 2009), and are native speakers of the child’s own language (as opposed 
to those with accents; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011). 
A consistent finding in this body of literature is that children prefer to learn from 
speakers who are knowledgeable versus those who are not (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005; Birch et al., 2008). Specifically, speakers who demonstrate a 
history of knowledge (e.g., accurate object labeling; e.g., Corriveau, Meints, & Harris; 
2009; Koenig et al., 2004; Scofield & Behrend, 2008) as well as speakers who announce 
their knowledge (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) are preferred 
to speakers who have a history of inaccurate labeling or announce their ignorance. 
Children give greater weight to speakers’ knowledge than other characteristics.  For 
example, children override their preference for learning from adults when a child 
informant has demonstrated a history of accuracy or if the information being sought is 
more child-relevant (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Further, 
children attend to whether speakers have had the opportunity to acquire particular 
knowledge, and will excuse inaccuracies if resulting from lack of exposure (e.g., 
Brosseau-Liard & Birch, in press; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). 
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Together, the research suggests that children are highly tuned to cues about a 
speaker’s knowledge state. However, speakers must not only possess knowledge to be 
effective informational sources, they must also be able to convey their knowledge in a 
coherent manner. Knowledge becomes meaningless if it is not presented in a manner that 
renders it accessible to a recipient. Certainly, there are undergraduate students who, 
following an incomprehensible lecture from a learned professor, would attest to this 
distinction. It is, therefore, beneficial for children to recognize not only who is 
knowledgeable, but also who possesses the skills to effectively communicate their 
knowledge.  In this study, we sought to determine whether children are more likely to 
rely on speakers who avoid ambiguous descriptions relative to speakers who use 
ambiguous language, and further, whether ambiguous speakers are differentiated from 
speakers who provide inaccurate information. 
Successful communication is guided by a number of implicit rules regarding the 
amount of information and manner through which it should be relayed.  When conversing 
with others, effective speakers provide enough information to avoid ambiguity (Maxims 
of Quality & Manner; Grice, 1975). For example, when describing a book amongst a 
stack of books, a clear description would uniquely identify the specific book desired (e.g., 
“the statistics book”) whereas an ambiguous statement would not (e.g., “the book”). 
Successful listeners must be able to determine when communicative ambiguity has 
occurred so that miscomprehension can be avoided through the use of clarifying 
questions. The ability to detect ambiguity is an essential component of children’s 
developing communicative competence. Further, determining which speakers provide the 
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most unambiguous information would enable children to maximize communicative 
success. 
However, past research has demonstrated that children under the age of 6 have 
difficulty identifying ambiguous language (e.g., Cosgrove & Patterson, 1977; Ironsmith 
& Whitehurst, 1978; Robinson, 1981).  For example, when provided with ambiguous 
information, children often believe that the information is sufficient for them to respond 
accurately (Ackerman, 1981; Robinson & Whittaker, 1985).  Early school-age children 
also overestimate the knowledge to be gained from ambiguous information (Chandler & 
Helm, 1984; Taylor, 1988; Robinson & Robinson, 1982, Asher, 1976), do not ask 
clarifying questions (Cosgrove & Patterson, 1977; Ironsmith & Whitehurst, 1978; 
Robinson, 1981) and believe that if listeners tried harder they would be more successful 
at understanding ambiguous messages (Robinson & Robinson, 1978). Children under the 
age of 6 have an especially difficult time identifying communicative ambiguity when 
they are previously informed of the intended meaning of the statement (Beal & Belgrad 
1990; Sodian, 1988).  For example, when 4 year olds saw where a sticker was hidden, 
they were more likely to state that the recipient of an ambiguous clue knew where the 
sticker was, relative to children who were ignorant of the sticker location (Nilsen, 
Graham, Smith & Chambers, 2008). In this way, preschool-children show a tendency to 
conflate their own knowledge of the intended meaning of an inadequate message with 
that of the ignorant listener.  This makes it difficult for children to detect the ambiguity 
inherent in a message. This pattern of results may be due to a ‘curse of knowledge’ 
(Birch & Bloom, 2003; 2004), describing a more pervasive social bias, in which children 
have difficulty with appreciating the mental states of a naïve others.  However, as 
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children develop (e.g., preschool-age), they become better able to detect ambiguity when 
they are aware of the intended meaning of the statement (Beal & Belgrad, 1990; Social, 
1988).  
Despite early school-age children’s difficulty with explicitly identifying 
communicative ambiguity, preschool-age children demonstrate implicit sensitivity to 
communicative ambiguity (Nilsen et al., 2008). For example, children take longer to 
make a decision on ambiguous versus unambiguous tasks  (Bearingson & Levey, 1977; 
Plumert, 1996), demonstrate more hesitant non-verbal behavior after ambiguous 
instructions (Beal & Flavell, 1982; Patterson, Cosgrove & O’Brien, 1980) and evidence 
eye movements reflecting more consideration of alternatives after hearing ambiguous 
statements (Sekerina, Stormswold & Hestvik, 2004). Whereas children’s implicit 
sensitivity to communicative ambiguity remains consistent across the late preschool 
years, their explicit evaluation of clarity increases (Nilsen & Graham, in press). Thus, 
although young children may not explicitly be able to say that a speaker provided 
insufficient information, they have implicit sensitivity to this fact. Pertinent to the present 
study, it may be the case that children who are not explicitly able to identify ambiguous 





The main goal of the present study was to determine whether children use speaker 
clarity to determine from whom to solicit information.  Certainly, adults often generate 
utterances that are insufficient for their conversational partners (e.g., Ferreira & Dell, 
2000; Kraljic & Brennan, 2005) without recognizing the ambiguity inherent in their 
utterances (e.g., Keysar & Henly, 2002).  This suggests that children will often encounter 
speakers who provide insufficient information. It would be advantageous for children to 
be able to identify which individuals are able to pass on information in an effective 
manner. Given that both school-age and preschool-age children demonstrate an implicit 
sensitivity to ambiguity, it is anticipated that both age groups will show a preference for 
soliciting information from unambiguous compared to ambiguous speakers.  However, as 
preschool-age children do not demonstrate an explicit sensitivity to ambiguity, the 
prediction is that only school-age children will be able to explicitly identify that 
unambiguous speakers are more helpful than ambiguous speakers.  In order to address 
these hypotheses, preschool-age children (4- to 5-years-old) and school-age children (6- 
to 7-years-old) engaged in a speaker clarity task. During this task children were presented 
with clues to the location of a dot hidden under pictures in a book by pairs of alternating, 
videotaped speakers. These ages were chosen as it has been found that children’s ability 
to appreciate ambiguity emerges at the end of their fifth year (Nilsen & Graham, in 
press). During the task, each speaker in the pairs consistently provided clues that varied 
by clarity and accuracy. Specifically, speakers either provided unambiguous clues that 
clearly identified the correct picture concealing the dot, ambiguous clues that did not 
provide sufficient information to locate the dot (but were accurate in the sense that the 
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information was not misleading), and unambiguous but inaccurate clues that clearly 
identified an incorrect location. For ease of explanation, in the remainder of this paper 
ambiguous/accurate clues are referred to as “Ambiguous” clues; unambiguous/accurate 
clues are referred to as “Unambiguous” clues; and unambiguous/inaccurate clues are 
referred to as “Inaccurate” clues.  
After children were presented with the clues from each speaker in the pair, they 
were asked to indicate who they would like to choose to help them find a special sticker.  
Although children’s speaker choices constituted an overt action, they did not necessitate 
that children understood why they preferred one speaker over the next. As such, children 
were asked to rate each of the speaker’s ability to provide information. These speaker 
ratings allowed for an assessment of children’s explicit detection of communicative 
ambiguity.  In this way, we were able to determine whether children preferred to rely on 
unambiguous versus ambiguous speakers, as well as whether children viewed ambiguous 
speakers as being different from inaccurate speakers. Further, whether children 
understood why one speaker would be preferred over the other. To link this research with 
previous work, unambiguous accurate and inaccurate speakers were also compared.   
The second goal was to assess whether prior knowledge of the intended meaning 
of the clue would disrupt children’s ability to detect communicative ambiguity and alter 
subsequent speaker choices. To accomplish this goal, half the children were told where 
the dot was hidden prior to being provided with the clues. As per previous research (e.g., 
Sodian, 1988; Nilsen et al., 2008) we anticipated that children would have more difficulty 
detecting communicative ambiguity in this situation as they would conflate their own 
knowledge of the intended meaning with the semantic information presented in the clue. 
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Therefore, we anticipated that children who were provided with prior knowledge would 
have more difficulty in determining who would be the most helpful informant. However, 
as this ability develops across the preschool- and early school-age period, it was 
anticipated that preschool-age children would have more difficulty than school-age 
children making this decision.   
To examine the extent to which search times related to ambiguity detection and 
speaker choices, children’s search latency following the speakers’ clues was measured.  
This level of analysis allowed for an examination of the extent to which children’s 
implicit sensitivity to ambiguity (e.g., longer search times) impacts their explicit 
evaluations (e.g., speaker ratings). Past research has demonstrated both congruity and 
incongruity between children’s implicit and explicit detection of ambiguity (e.g., Nilsen 
& Graham, in press). Here we were interested in assessing whether children who show 
longer search times following ambiguous clues were less likely to determine the 
ambiguous speaker to be a good informational source.  In addition, children’s success 
rate in finding the hidden dots was measured to determine the extent to which the 
outcome of the clues affected children’s subsequent speaker choices and sensitivity to 
communicative ambiguity.  
Method 
Participants  
 Forty children aged 4 and 5 years-old (11 males, M = 59.43 months, SD = 7.30) 
and 42 children aged 6 and 7 years-old (14 males, M = 85.14 months, SD = 6.20) were 
recruited from schools and preschools within a mid-sized North American city.  An 
additional 12 children were tested, but their data was not included in the analyses as they 
9 
 
did not follow task instructions. Within each age group, excluded children did not differ 
from included children in terms of age or verbal skills (ps > .53); however, within the 
older age group, the proportion of boys was greater in the excluded sample compared to 
the included sample (t (49) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .75).  As gender did not significantly 
relate to the dependent variables, it was not included in the analyses. Parents of all 
participants reported that their children were fluent in English. Children were assigned to 
either a knowledgeable condition (n = 19 preschool children; 22 school-age children), or 
an unknowledgeable condition (n = 21 preschool children, 20 school-age children).  The 
ages of children and the distribution of sex in the knowledgeable and unknowledgeable 
conditions did not differ from each other (ps > .48).   
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually by an experimenter in a quiet room within 
their school setting or in the research laboratory. The speaker clarity task was always 
administered first, followed by a language task.   
Speaker Clarity Task. The speaker clarity task was modeled from previous 
speaker reliability research wherein children observe two speakers providing information 
and then are asked to make a choice between the informants. Our task involved 
presenting children with videotaped clues to the location of ‘dots’ hidden under pictures 
in a stimulus book positioned in front of the child (see Figure 1). The clues were 
presented by alternating pairs of speakers who differed in ambiguity and accuracy (i.e., 
forming different speaker-type comparisons). Following the clues (i.e., learning trials) 
children were asked to indicate who they would like to solicit information from (speaker 
choice) and to rate the proficiency of each speaker (speaker rating).  
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Before describing the procedures in detail, the materials are described. First, there 
were three different types of videotaped speakers, namely speakers who consistently 
presented ambiguous clues, speakers who presented unambiguous clues (that accurately 
identified a location), and speakers who presented inaccurate (yet, unambiguous) clues. 
The clues all had the same format (i.e., ‘It’s under the __one.’). Speakers all maintained a 
neutral tone of voice and facial expression when generating the clues. Each clue had the 
potential to be ambiguous or unambiguous and accurate or inaccurate depending on the 
context in which it was uttered. That is, the clarity of the clue depended on what three 
pictures were displayed in the stimulus book and the accuracy depended on which picture 
the dot was concealed under.   
Each page of the stimulus book depicted a row of 3 pictures that were either 3 
different shapes of the same color (e.g., a red circle, a red triangle, and a red star) or 3 
identical shapes of different colors (e.g., a red circle, a green circle, and a yellow circle). 
On each page, a ‘dot’ was concealed underneath one of the three pictures. ‘Ambiguous’ 
clues were accurate, however, did not provide enough information to identify one of the 
three pictures.  For example, if all three pictures were red, an ambiguous clue would be, 
“It’s under the red one.” ‘Unambiguous’ clues were accurate and provided enough 
information to identify one on the three pictures (i.e., the picture that concealed the dot).  
For example, if all three pictures were red, but different shapes, an unambiguous clue 
would be, “It’s under the square one.” ‘Inaccurate’ clues unambiguously identified one of 
the three pictures that did not have a dot beneath it. For example, if the dot was concealed 
under the triangle picture which was next to a square and circle, an incorrect clue would 
be, “It’s under the square one.”  
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By pairing the different speaker types (ambiguous, unambiguous, and inaccurate), 
there were three different comparison types:  Ambiguous / Unambiguous, Ambiguous / 
Inaccurate, and Inaccurate / Unambiguous. Each comparison type involved a series of 
learning trials where children searched for the dots beneath the pictures following clues 
from alternating speakers. Children were exposed to each of the three speaker-type 
comparisons three separate times throughout the study, for a total of nine comparisons. 
These nine comparisons occurred in three blocks.  Each block consisted of one of each of 
the three different comparison types (i.e., the Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparison, the 
Ambiguous / Inaccurate comparison and the Inaccurate / Unambiguous comparison).  
The specific order of comparison types within blocks was counterbalanced across 
children.  Each of the 9 comparisons (of alternating speakers) involved different 
individuals (for a total of 18 speakers). All of the 18 video-taped speakers were 
Caucasian women between the ages of 22 and 35 with brown hair pulled back from their 
face. Each speaker wore a uniquely colored t-shirt. All other accessories were removed. 
Whether a particular speaker gave an ambiguous, unambiguous or incorrect clue was 
counterbalanced across children. This counterbalancing was essential to ensure children’s 
choices were based on clarity or accuracy rather than some idiosyncratic quality of a 
particular speaker. 
Children were pre-assigned to a knowledgeable condition or an unknowledgeable 
condition. In the knowledgeable condition, children were provided with information 
about the sticker location prior to receiving clues from the speakers (i.e., they were 
shown by the experimenter which picture the sticker was hidden under), whereas in the 
unknowledgeable condition they were not.  Otherwise, the procedure was similar in both 
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conditions: Children first received three practice trials wherein they viewed a video of a 
speaker giving a clue and subsequently searched for the dot under the shapes.  Following 
the practice trials the children were presented with the nine different speaker 
comparisons, where they received clues from the videotaped speakers. Children were 
only allowed to look under one shape following each clue. In order to motivate children 
to find the dots, they received a stamp in a booklet every time they found a dot.  
Following two clues from each speaker in the pair (i.e., the four learning trials for each 
comparison) children were asked to choose who they would like to receive a clue from to 
help them find a special sticker hidden under one of the shapes on the next page (i.e., 
speaker choice, e.g., “You can choose either the girl in the blue shirt or the girl in the 
green shirt to help you find the sticker. Who do you want to help you?”). The order of 
presentation of the two speakers in the experimenter’s question was counterbalanced 
across children. Pictures of the two speakers were used to assist children in making their 
decision. Following their choice, children were asked to rate how good each speaker was 
at helping them find the dots (i.e., speaker rating, e.g., “How good was the girl in the red 
shirt at helping you find the dots? Was she always good, sometimes good, or never 
good?”).  The verbal instructions of the rating were accompanied with a visual scale 
depicting the three options in differently sized bars.  “Always good” was the tallest bar, 
“Never good” was the shortest bar (i.e., just a thin line) and “sometimes good” was half 
way between never and always.  Next, children were played the video of their chosen 
speaker providing her clue and children searched for the sticker by choosing a shape to 
lift.   
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Variables of interest were the children’s choice of speakers and ratings of speaker 
proficiency following the learning trials, as well as children’s search latencies and 
success in finding the dot during the ambiguous learning trials.   
Coding. Children’s responses were videotaped and later coded to assess their 
response latencies during the learning trials.  The temporal window of observation was 
the beginning of the adjective that described the target picture (e.g., “b” in “blue”) to the 
point at which a picture was lifted up by the child.  Two research assistants, blind to the 
study hypotheses, coded the video recordings.  Adobe Premiere was used as it allows for 
video-audio synchrony and frame-by-frame analysis.  An intraclass correlation (ICC) 
coefficient of 0.99, p < .001 (based on 16 participants, 20% of the sample) demonstrated 
a high level of agreement between the two coders.  
Language Task. In order to ensure that the children in our groups did not differ 
on their receptive language skills, the Picture Vocabulary subtest of the Test of Language 
Development Primary Third Edition (TOLD-P:3, Newcomer & Hammill, 1997) was 
administered. On this test children were asked to point to the picture that represented the 
word spoken by the experimenter. This test was administered in a standardized fashion. It 
was found that the receptive language abilities of children in the knowledgeable condition 
did not differ from that of children in the unknowledgeable condition for either age group 
(ps > .20). 
Results 
Children’s choice of speaker 
Three 2 (Knowledge condition: knowledgeable / unknowledgeable) X 2 (Age: 
preschool versus school-age) univariate ANOVAs examined whether children’s 
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preferences for speakers were impacted by the child’s age or knowledge.  In order to 
avoid violating the assumption of independence of observations, the dependent variables 
chosen were the proportion of times one speaker type was chosen in each comparison 
type. Specifically, in the two comparisons involving an ambiguous speaker (i.e., 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous; Ambiguous/Inaccurate) the dependent variable was the 
proportion of times the ambiguous speaker was chosen. For the Inaccurate / 
Unambiguous comparison, the dependent variable was the proportion of times the 
inaccurate speaker was chosen. In order to determine whether children were showing a 
preference for one speaker type over another in a given comparison, the proportion of 
times that type of speaker was chosen was compared to chance (i.e., .5) using single 
sample t-tests.  
Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparisons. Analyses of children’s ambiguous 
speaker choices when an ambiguous speaker was compared to an unambiguous speaker 
revealed a significant main effect of age, F(1,78) = 7.66, p = .007, η
2
 = .09, but not 
knowledge, p = .10, nor a significant interaction between the two factors, p = .18. Older 
children were less likely to choose the ambiguous speaker (M = .21, SD = .23) than 
younger children (M = .36, SD = .29). However, both age groups were at less than chance 
levels in choosing the ambiguous speaker (preschoolers: t(39) = -3.13, p = .003, d = 
.48,school-age children; t(41) = -8.19, p < .001, d = 1.26). Thus, all children avoided 
soliciting information from ambiguous speakers compared with unambiguous speakers, 
but the preference for unambiguous speakers was stronger in school-age children.  
Ambiguous / Inaccurate comparisons. Children’s choice of an ambiguous 
speaker was examined when this speaker was compared with an inaccurate speaker. The 
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ANOVA revealed a main effect of knowledge, F(1,78) = 4.13, p = .05, η
2
 = .05, but not 
age, p = .12, nor was there a significant interaction between age and knowledge, p = .52.  
Across the ages, children in the knowledgeable condition (i.e., previously shown the 
location of the hidden dot) were less likely to choose the ambiguous speaker (M = .52, SD 
=.24) than children in the unknowledgeable condition (M = .64, SD =.29).  Follow-up 
single sample t-tests revealed that children in the unknowledgeable condition chose the 
ambiguous speaker more than chance, t(40) = 3.00, p = .005, d = .48.  However, children 
in the knowledgeable condition did not differ from chance in the proportion of times they 
chose the ambiguous speaker, p = .59.   
Inaccurate / Unambiguous comparisons. Children were also presented with a 
choice between an accurate and inaccurate speaker (i.e., Inaccurate / Unambiguous). 
Neither prior knowledge regarding the dot location nor age affected children’s choice of 
an inaccurate speaker (ps > .30). Collapsed across knowledge conditions and age, all 
children chose the inaccurate speaker at less than chance levels (M = .35, SD = .30, t(81) 
= -4.60, p < .001, d = .50).
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Together the results indicate that children show a clear preference for soliciting 
information from an unambiguous speaker relative to an ambiguous speaker. However, 
the school-age children show a greater preference than the preschool-age children. 
Children viewed the ambiguous speakers as being better informational sources than the 
inaccurate speakers, particularly when they did not possess prior knowledge of the 
intended location being referred to by the speakers. Consistent with previous work, 




Children in each group (i.e., divided into different cells based on age and knowledge) all chose the 
inaccurate speaker at less than chance levels (all ps < .01). 
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children prefer accurate speakers to those who have demonstrated a history of providing 
inaccurate information.  
Children’s ratings of speaker proficiency 
To assess children’s explicit detection of communicative ambiguity, children were 
asked to rate the proficiency of each speaker. For each of the speaker comparisons, we 
conducted a 2 (Knowledge condition) by 2 (Age) by 2 (Speaker Type – e.g., ambiguous 
versus unambiguous) mixed model ANOVA.  The dependent variable was the children’s 
ratings of ‘how good’ each speaker was at helping them find the dots.  The rating for each 
comparison ranged from 1(never good) to 3 (always good), which was then summed 
across the three times the children experienced that comparison type to provide a total 
score between 3 and 9. Significant interactions were followed up with comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction (.05/# of comparisons). 
Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparisons. The analysis of ratings for comparisons 
between ambiguous and unambiguous speakers revealed a main effect of age, F(1,78) = 
4.60, p = .035, η
2
 = .06 and speaker type, F(1,78) = 24.85, p < .001, η
2
 = .24, but no 
effect of knowledge, p = .10. The main effects of age and speaker type were qualified by 
a significant speaker type by age interaction, F(1,78) = 7.47, p = .008, η
2
 = 0.09.  Follow-
up paired samples t-tests indicated that school-age children rated the ambiguous speakers 
as being less ‘good’ at providing information (M = 5.67, SD = 1.87) than the 
unambiguous speakers (M = 7.55, SD = 1.43; t(41) = 4.97, p < .001, d = 1.13).  However, 
there was no difference in the ratings younger children made for ambiguous and 
unambiguous speakers, p = .09. School-age children’s ratings of the ambiguous speakers 
were lower (M = 5.67, SD = 1.87) than preschoolers ratings (M = 6.83, SD = 1.71, t(80) = 
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2.93, p = .004, d = .65), whereas there was no difference in how the two age groups rated 
the unambiguous speakers, p = .57. Thus, older children showed an explicit detection of 
communicative ambiguity that younger children did not demonstrate. There was also a 
significant interaction between age and knowledge (F(1, 78) = 6.96, p = .01, η
2
 = .08) 
such that older children in the knowledgeable condition rated speakers higher (M = 7.09, 
SD = .70) than did children in the unknowledgeable condition (M = 6.08, SD =  1.28; 
t(40) = 3.23, d = .98), while there was no difference in the ratings of the younger 
children, p = .51.   Therefore, when older children possess prior knowledge, they are 
more likely to rate both helpful and unhelpful messages higher than when they do not 
possess prior knowledge.  The 3 way interaction and the speaker by knowledge 
interactions were not significant and therefore were not explored further (speaker by age 
by knowledge, p = .18; speaker by knowledge, p = .40). 
Ambiguous / Inaccurate comparisons. When children heard clues from 
ambiguous versus inaccurate speakers, their ratings of speaker clarity revealed a main 
effect of age, F(1,78) = 16.48, p < .001, η
2
 = 0.17, such that across speaker types younger 
children (M = 6.65, SD = 1.10), relative to older children (M = 5.58, SD = 1.44), rated 
speakers as being better at providing information. There was also a main effect of speaker 
type, F(1,78) = 10.39, p = .002, η
2
 = .12, and knowledge, F(1,78) = 6.46, p = .013, η
2
 = 
.08, which was qualified by a significant speaker type by knowledge interaction, F(1,78) 
= 5.61, p = .020, η
2
 = .07.  Follow-up paired samples t-tests indicated that, collapsed 
across age, children who were unknowledgeable rated ambiguous speakers higher (M = 
6.39, SD = 1.81) than inaccurate speakers (M = 5.17, SD = 1.70, t(41) = 3.52, p < .001, d 
= .69).  However, when children were knowledgeable, there was no difference in their 
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ratings of the ambiguous and inaccurate speakers, p = .41.  Further, across the ages, 
knowledgeable children rated the inaccurate speakers higher (M = 6.32, SD = 1.47) than 
children who were not knowledgeable (M = 6.32, SD = 1.47), t (80) = 3.26, p = .002, d = 
.72.  However, children’s ratings of ambiguous speakers were not affected by their 
knowledge state, p =.71.  The 3 way interaction and other 2 way interactions were not 
significant and therefore were not explored further (speaker by age by knowledge, p = 
.40; age by speaker, p = .28; age by knowledge, p = .09).  
Inaccurate / Unambiguous comparisons. Children’s ratings of inaccurate and 
unambiguous speakers revealed a main effect of speaker type, F(1,78) = 32.95, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .30, but not knowledge, p = .38, nor age, p = .10. There was a significant interaction 
between speaker type and age, F(1,78) = 6.74, p = .01, η
2
 = .08.  Follow-up independent 
t-tests indicated that across the knowledge conditions, younger children rated inaccurate 
speakers higher (M = 6.23, SD = 1.82) than older children (M = 5.10, SD = 1.76, t(80) = 
2.86, p = .005, d = .63), however there was no difference in their ratings of unambiguous 
speakers, (younger children: M = 7.15, SD = 1.55, older children: M = 7.50, SD = 1.60), p 
= .32.  Further, both preschool- and school-age children rated unambiguous speakers 
higher than inaccurate speakers (preschool-age: t(39) = 2.23, d = .54, school-age: t(41) = 
6.05, d = 1.43, ps < .03).  The 3 way interaction and other 2 way interactions were not 
significant and therefore were not explored further (speaker by age by knowledge, p =.94; 
age by knowledge, p = .19; speaker by knowledge, p = .38). 
Together the results demonstrate that school-age children accurately determined 
that an ambiguous speaker was less proficient at providing information than an 
unambiguous speaker, but the preschoolers did not evidence such a distinction. When 
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comparing ambiguous to inaccurate speakers, the preschoolers showed a tendency to 
overestimate the proficiency of both speakers. Possessing prior knowledge of the 
intended location only impacted children’s ratings of ambiguous speakers when these 
speakers were compared to incorrect speakers.  
Impact of outcome of clues 
Recall that on the ambiguous trials the speakers’ clues did not disambiguate 
between the potential locations. However, it was still possible for the children to find the 
hidden ‘dot’ by randomly choosing the correct location. Not surprisingly, there was no 
difference in the number of dots found following ambiguous clues by school-age (M = 
.35, SD = .08) versus preschool-age children (M = .38, SD = .19; p = .40).  
Chi squared analyses were conducted to determine whether children’s successful 
location of the ‘dot’ on the ambiguous trials influenced their choice of an ambiguous 
versus unambiguous speaker. (As children in the knowledgeable condition were informed 
about the location of the dot prior to hearing the clue, analyses were only conducted on 
the choices of children who were unknowledgeable).  To assess the influence of finding 
the dot, for each of the three Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparisons, we created three 
groups of children based on the number of dots they found following the two ambiguous 
clues in the learning trials (i.e., those who found neither of the dots, one dot, or both 
dots).  Then each group’s speaker choices were assessed. Children who did not find either 
of the two dots were less likely to choose the ambiguous speaker than the unambiguous 
speaker for each of the three Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparisons (χ
2
(1, n = 15) = 
5.40, χ
2
(1, n = 19) = 6.37, χ
2
(1, n = 17) = 7.12, respectively for the first, second, and third 
comparisons, ps < .05).  In contrast, children who found both dots following the 
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ambiguous trials were just as likely to choose the ambiguous speaker as the unambiguous 
speaker for all three comparisons, ps > .14. Children who found only one dot following 
ambiguous clues did not demonstrate a consistent pattern. That is, at the first Ambiguous 
/ Unambiguous comparison they were just as likely to chose the ambiguous speaker as 
the unambiguous speaker (p = .32), however, at the two later comparisons they showed a 
preference for the unambiguous speaker ( χ
2
(1, n = 16) = 6.25, χ
2
(1, n = 19) = 8.90, 
respectively for the second and third comparisons, ps < .05).  
This pattern of results provides some evidence that, when considering ambiguous 
versus unambiguous speakers, children’s decisions about who to solicit information from 
were influenced by the number of times they located the dot.  
Latency during learning trials 
We were interested in assessing whether implicit measures revealed sensitivity to 
ambiguity, and further whether these measures related to children’s explicit judgments. 
Children’s response latencies during the learning trials in the Ambiguous/Unambiguous 
comparisons were subjected to a 2 (Age) by 2 (Speaker type – ambiguous, unambiguous) 
by 2 (Knowledge condition – unknowledgeable, knowledgeable) mixed model ANOVA.  
Statistical outliers (i.e., +3 standard deviations from the mean) were removed from the 
analyses).  Results revealed a main effect of speaker, F(1,76) = 32.47, p < .001, η
2
 = .30, 
and knowledge, F(1,76) = 26.91, p < .001, η
2
 = .26, but not age, p = .21.  The main 
effects were qualified by a speaker by knowledge interaction, F(1,76) = 12.78, p = .001, 
η
2
 = .14.  Follow-up paired samples t-tests indicated that children in both knowledge 
conditions took longer to respond to ambiguous clues (unknowledgeable: M = 4357 ms, 
SD = 2181, knowledgeable: M = 2474 ms, SD = 977) versus unambiguous clues 
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(unknowledgeable: M = 2463 ms, SD = 1166, t(38) = 4.78, p < .001, d = 1.08; 
knowledgeable: M = 2033 ms, SD = 770, t(39) = 3.29, p = .002, d = .50).  Further, 
children who were unknowledgeable took longer than children who were knowledgeable 
when responding to ambiguous clues, t(78) = 5.02, p < .001, d = .44, but there was no 
difference in response times for unambiguous clues, p = .20.  The 3 way interaction and 
other 2 way interactions were not significant and therefore were not explored further 
(speaker by age by knowledge, p =.31; age by knowledge, p = .30; age by speaker, p = 
.74). 
Relations between children’s response latencies and their speaker choices and 
speaker ratings were examined using Pearson correlations. As there was a significant 
difference in response latencies between children in the two knowledge conditions, the 
correlations were conducted separately for each knowledge condition. In both knowledge 
conditions, the amount of time children took to respond to ambiguous clues did not relate 
to their choice of speaker, ps > .13. However, when knowledgeable of the intended 
sticker location, children who demonstrated longer search latencies rated the ambiguous 
speakers’ proficiencies as being lower, r(41) = -.36, p = .02.  This relationship remained 
when partial correlations were conducted controlling for children’s response time 
following unambiguous clues, r(37) = -.50, p = .001.  In contrast, a significant relation 
between latency and speaker ratings did not emerge for children in the unknowledgeable 
condition, p = .53.  
Discussion 
Preschool and young school-age children showed a preference for obtaining 
information from unambiguous compared to ambiguous speakers. Further, school-age 
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children rated the ambiguous speakers as being less proficient than the unambiguous 
speakers. However, compared to preschoolers, the older children were more successful in 
accurately rating the ambiguous speaker as being less proficient in providing messages. 
Children did not view the ambiguous speaker as being incorrect, though, as they were 
more likely to choose an ambiguous speaker over an incorrect speaker. Similarly, their 
ratings of the speakers demonstrated understanding that ambiguous speakers were better 
at providing messages than inaccurate speakers. Consistent with previous work (e.g., 
Jaswal, Carrington Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010), children preferred to solicit information 
from unambiguously accurate speakers relative to inaccurate speakers. 
Children’s prior knowledge of the speaker’s intended meaning was manipulated 
to determine whether children would conflate their prior knowledge with the semantic 
content of the clue, leading to greater difficulty in appreciating communicative 
ambiguity.  Such conflation has been demonstrated in previous work where children have 
difficulty suppressing their prior knowledge to evaluate a clue from a naive listener’s 
perspective (e.g., Nilsen et al., 2008). Prior knowledge did not impact children’s 
judgments between ambiguous versus unambiguous speakers. However, knowledge did 
affect children’s speaker preferences when judging between an ambiguous versus 
inaccurate speaker. In this context, having prior knowledge of the intended location 
disrupted children’s ability to differentiate an ambiguous speaker from an inaccurate 
speaker. This difficulty was found both in children’s choices for speakers as well as in 
their ratings of speakers.  
There are several possibilities for what specific information children are relying 
on in order to determine that an unambiguous speaker is a better option relative to an 
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ambiguous speaker. First, it could be that when faced with an ambiguous clue, children 
feel a sense of uncertainty which influences speaker preferences. Further, this feeling of 
uncertainty may be relied on without children actually possessing the metacognitive 
awareness that a clue provided insufficient information (Robinson & Whittaker, 1985). 
Certainly, children took longer to respond to ambiguous clues relative to unambiguous 
clues, which is suggestive of increased uncertainty. However, the finding that, even when 
knowledgeable, children are able to differentiate between ambiguous and unambiguous 
speakers suggests that this explanation is not sufficient. If children only relied on feelings 
of uncertainty to detect ambiguity, then children knowledgeable of the intended location 
would have had more difficulty because the uncertainty is reduced (Robinson & 
Robinson, 1983). A second possibility is that children detected the ambiguity inherent 
within the clue and then used this information to form impressions of the speakers. 
Certainly, past research has shown that children are sensitive to the communicative styles 
of speakers, in that speakers who follow regular morpholinguistic rules are preferred over 
those who use irregular rules (Jaswal, McKercher, & VanderBorght, 2008). If children 
are in fact using their sensitivity to ambiguity to decide from whom to solicit information, 
they would be demonstrating impressive communicative competence given that previous 
research has suggested that children have difficulty detecting communicative ambiguity 
(Ackerman, 1981; Robinson, 2001; Robinson & Whittaker, 1985) and often attribute the 
associated failure to the listener rather than speaker (Robinson & Robinson, 1978).  
However, a third explanation for the results of Study 1 is that children relied on the 
outcome of the speaker’s clues, namely whether they found the dot or not. That is, it 
could be argued that children did not choose the unambiguous speaker more often 
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because they understood that this individual avoided communicative ambiguity (or even 
that they detected the communicative ambiguity), but because they were more successful 
in finding the dots when provided with clues by the unambiguous speakers. Indeed, we 
did find that children who did not find the dots following ambiguous clues preferred the 
unambiguous speaker, whereas those children who found dots did not differentiate 
between the unambiguous and ambiguous speakers. In order to assess whether children 
actually appreciate the communicative clarity of the speakers, as opposed to the 
outcomes, children’s speaker preferences would need to be assessed under conditions 
where no feedback regarding the success of a clue was provided.  Study 2 addressed this 
issue by examining children’s speaker preference in a context where they did not search 





 Children pay attention to outcomes when making judgments about informational 
sources. For example, four year-olds track the relative frequency of errors when deciding 
who would be a preferred informational source (Pasquini et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
preschoolers use the reactions of bystanders when deciding on the credibility of speakers 
(Fusaro & Harris, 2008). Thus, it is plausible that children in Study 1 were attending to 
the outcome (i.e., whether the dot was found) in addition to, or rather than, the 
communicative clarity of the speakers, to decide that an unambiguous speaker was a 
more helpful informational source than an ambiguous speaker. To assess whether 
children were indeed sensitive to communicative ambiguity, children in Study 2 were 
assessed under conditions where the outcome was not observed. Specifically, in Study 2, 
following each clue, children were not shown whether their choices of the dot location 
were successful. As the primary question was whether children would prefer 
unambiguous speakers over ambiguous speakers, children were only presented with this 
comparison (as opposed to all three different comparisons of Study 1). As children have 
been shown to be sensitive to speakers’ communicative styles (Jaswal et al., 2008) it was 
anticipated that school-age children would be able to detect the helpfulness of each 
speakers’ communicative style and prefer to learn from unambiguous over ambiguous 
speakers, despite being ignorant of the outcome.  However, given that preschool-children 
in Study 1 did not rate ambiguous and unambiguous speakers differently, it was expected 
that they would be more likely to rely on the outcome as opposed to the quality of the 
message and therefore would not prefer to learn from the unambiguous speaker when 
ignorant of the outcome. If children in Study 2 continue to choose unambiguous over 
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ambiguous speakers, this preference can be attributed to sensitivity to message clarity (or 
ambiguity) rather than the outcome.  
Method 
Participants 
Nineteen children between the ages of 4- and 5 (10 males; M = 58.11 months, SD 
= 6.52) and 22 children between the ages of 6 and 7 (11 males, M = 83.77 months, SD = 
5.99) were individually tested in one session at a research laboratory. Children were 
recruited from a database of interested families and from community preschools. 
Participants were all reported by parents to be fluent in English. None of the children had 
participated in Study 1. The ages of the children did not differ from those in Study 1, ps > 
.40 
Materials and Procedure 
Speaker Clarity Task. The procedure for the speaker clarity task in Study 2 was 
identical to that of Study 1 with the following exceptions:  First, children were only 
presented with the Ambiguous / Unambiguous comparison. Children were administered 
this comparison type three times, all with different pairs of speakers. Second, children 
were always unaware of the sticker location prior to hearing clues. That is, unlike Study 
1, no children were shown where the dot was located before they were presented with 
clues from the speakers.  Finally, children did not find out about the outcome of their 
choices based on the clues from speakers. Specifically, instead of looking under the 
pictures in the stimulus book to find the dot (as in Study 1), the children were asked to 
indicate where they thought the dot was hidden by pointing to the picture. Following 
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children’s point, the next learning trial was administered – thus, children never found out 
whether the picture they pointed to concealed the dot or not.  
Language Task. The Picture Vocabulary subtest of the TOLD-P:3 was 
administered as described in Study 1. The receptive language abilities of children in 
Study 2 did not differ from those in Study 1 (preschool-age children, p = .85; school-age 
children, p = .19).   
Results and Discussion 
Speaker Clarity Task 
Children’s choice of speaker. In order to assess whether children showed a 
preference for one speaker type over another, the proportion of times children chose the 
ambiguous speaker was compared to chance (.5) using single sample t-tests. It was found 
that school-age children chose the ambiguous speaker at a level less than chance (M = 
.36, SD = .23, t(21) = -2.81,  p = .01, d = .61).  In contrast, the preschool-age children’s 
choice of the ambiguous speaker, (M = .51, SD = .30) did not differ from chance, p = .90.  
These results suggest that, in the absence of feedback regarding the success of the 
outcome of each clue, younger children were not able to solicit information from the 
clearest speaker (i.e., the unambiguous speaker).  In contrast, older children solicited 
information from the speaker who demonstrated communicative clarity, even in the 
absence of feedback.  However, although there was a trend for the preschool-age children 
to choose the ambiguous speaker more often than the school-age children, this 
comparison did not reach significance, t(39) = 1.75, p = 09, d = .56.  
Children’s ratings of speaker proficiency. A 2 (Age) by 2 (Speaker Type – 
ambiguous versus unambiguous) mixed model ANOVA was conducted with the 
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dependent variable of children’s ratings of “how good” each speaker was at helping them 
find the dots (with the same procedures as Study 1). 
Results demonstrated no significant main effects of speaker type or age, ps > .55, 
however there was a significant age by speaker type interaction, F(1, 39) = 10.64, p = 
.002, η
2
 = .21.  Follow-up paired samples t-tests indicated that older children rated the 
ambiguous speakers as being less ‘good’ at providing information (M = 6.36, SD = 1.36) 
than the unambiguous speakers (M = 7.68, SD = .99, t(21) = 3.47,  p = .002, d= 1.11).  
However, there was no difference in the ratings younger children made for ambiguous 
and unambiguous speakers, p = .13. School-age children’s ratings of ambiguous speakers 
were lower than those of the preschool-age children (M = 7.32, SD = 1.57, t(39) = 2.08, p 
=.04, d = .65). Furthermore, school-age children rated the unambiguous speakers as being 
more proficient than did preschool-age children, (M = 6.32, SD = 2.21, t(39) = 2.61, p = 
.01, d = .79. Thus, in the absence of feedback, older children demonstrated an 





For knowledge to be successfully imparted, speakers must provide information in 
a way that is clear and accessible to a listener. Two studies investigated whether children 
use communicative clarity as a cue to establish informant preferences. Specifically, we 
assessed whether children prefer to acquire information from speakers who demonstrated 
a history of providing unambiguous descriptions, relative to speakers who provided 
ambiguous descriptions, (as well as whether ambiguous speakers are preferred to 
inaccurate speakers and whether children differentiate between unambiguous accurate 
and inaccurate speakers). In the first study, during exposure to the different speakers, 
children received information regarding the outcome of speakers clues (i.e., whether the 
clues lead to successful location of the ‘dot’) whereas in the second study, children did 
not receive such information. Several key findings regarding children’s application of 
their ability to detect communicative ambiguity emerged. 
First, we found that both preschool-age and school-age children preferred to 
receive information from unambiguous speakers more often than ambiguous speakers in 
a situation where the outcome of the speakers’ clues was evident. Specifically, in the first 
study, both age groups of children chose the ambiguous speakers (relative to 
unambiguous speakers) less often than expected by chance levels. This finding extends 
previous work demonstrating that 4-and 5-years-olds (but not 3-year-olds) show modest 
preferences for speakers who do not violate the Gricean Maxim of Quantity (i.e., that 
speakers should provide enough information to make a statement clear; Grice, 1975; 
Eskritt, Whalen, & Lee, 2008). In the second study, when children did not have 
information about the outcome of the speakers’ clues, school-age children, but not 
30 
 
preschool-age children, continued to show a preference for unambiguous speakers. Thus, 
in general, children attend to and use communicative clarity as a cue to determining from 
whom to solicit information. However, results from both studies highlight a 
developmental progression in children’s use of communicative ambiguity as a cue to 
informant reliability. In the first study, although preschool-age children showed a 
preference for unambiguous speakers, they chose these unambiguous speakers less often 
than the school-age children. Furthermore, in the first study, only the school-age children 
differentiated the unambiguous from ambiguous speaker in their ratings of 
communicative proficiency. These findings suggest that preschoolers may not have an 
explicit understanding of the communicative clarity of speakers.  That is, when making 
their choice, preschoolers may not have clearly understood why the unambiguous 
speakers were preferred. This notion is further emphasized by the fact that in the second 
study, when not provided with outcome regarding the clues, the preschool-age children 
did not differentiate between unambiguous and ambiguous speakers in their choices. It is 
likely that the preschoolers in the first study were assisted by the information regarding 
the outcome of clues and showed a preference for the unambiguous speakers because 
there was greater success following their clues. That is, preschoolers likely relied on a 
cue akin to ‘good things happen more often with this speaker,’ rather than appreciating 
that the outcome of the clue was due to the clarity of the speakers’ clues per se. In 
contrast, school-age children, although likely assisted by outcome information, were able 
to rely on their ambiguity detection skills so that even in a context where the success of 
speakers’ clues was not evident, they preferentially chose unambiguous speakers.   
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Together, these findings suggest that by the end of the preschool years, children 
can reflect on the communicative outcomes of speakers and use this as a cue to 
determining speaker choices, and, at least by 6 or 7-years-old, children demonstrate an 
explicit appreciation for communicative clarity that can be used as a cue to evaluating 
informational sources. This finding adds to the growing literature on children’s 
communicative development by demonstrating children’s application of ambiguity 
detection to determine speaker reliability. Previous work has demonstrated that early 
school-age children have difficulty with detecting communicative ambiguity – for 
example, by overestimating their knowledge after being presented with ambiguous 
instructions or by making decisions based on insufficient information (e.g., Beck & 
Robinson, 2001; Beck, Robinson, & Freeth, 2008; Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 
1981; Ironsmith & Whitehurst, 1978; Robinson & Robinson, 1982; 1983). With this in 
mind, we found that in the domain of determining speaker reliance, children showed 
impressive sensitivity. Here, the early school-age children were able to evaluate the 
linguistic information of the clue based on the contextual backdrop in which it occurred 
(i.e., depending on the context, the same clue was ambiguous, unambiguous, or 
inaccurate), track and link the evaluations as a characteristic of the individual speaker, 
and make preferential judgments accordingly. As children will likely encounter speakers 
who provide ambiguous information (i.e., given that even adult speakers often fail to 
provide sufficient information for their interlocutors; e.g., Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Kraljic 
& Brennan, 2005), showing sensitivity to this cue allows children to maximize 
communicative success.  
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Although it is not clear what cognitive abilities are required for children to use  
communicative ambiguity as a cue to speaker reliability, some researchers have 
speculated about what is required for their ability to detect ambiguity in general 
communication (e.g., metacognition; Flavell et al., 1981 or executive function; Nilsen & 
Graham, in press).  For example, successful ambiguity detection requires that children 
understand the message within the contextual backdrop (i.e., being able to determine 
what information from the context is relevant to understanding the message).  Therefore, 
when considering referents, children are required to think flexibly about their properties 
(i.e., being able to consider a blue ball as both “blue” and “ball”). This would require the 
cognitive abilities of abstraction (i.e., the ability to pick out individual features of objects 
and experience them separately; Werner, 1984) and cognitive flexibility (i.e., the ability 
to shift mental sets and be able to switch between viewing different dimensions of an 
object; Anderson, 2002).  Indeed, a recent study suggests that there is a link between 
ambiguity detection and the cognitive abilities of abstraction and flexibility (Gillis & 
Nilsen, in prep).  Working memory (i.e., the ability to hold information in mind in order 
to manipulate it) would likely also be involved in ambiguity detection as it could help 
children to more efficiently assess the context while holding a statement in mind to 
determine it is clear.  In addition, with regards to ambiguity detection from a third person 
perspective, Nilsen and Graham, (in press) found inhibition to be related to children’s 
ability to detect ambiguity.  This was likely the case because inhibition allowed children 
to more easily disregard their own perspective in order to understand that the listener had 
not been provided with enough information.  In the current study, school-age children, 
but not preschool-age children, rated unambiguous speakers as more helpful than 
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ambiguous speakers, and were able to choose the most helpful speaker even when they 
were not aware of the outcome associated with unambiguous compared to ambiguous 
clues.  This age difference may be due to the development of cognitive skills that support 
ambiguity detection (e.g., abstraction, cognitive flexibility, working memory, and 
inhibition).   
A second finding from the current study was that prior knowledge of location did 
not disrupt children’s ability to differentiate between ambiguous and unambiguous 
informants (or between unambiguous and inaccurate speakers). That is, even when 
children were provided with information about the location of the hidden dot prior to 
receiving clues, they showed a preference for unambiguous versus ambiguous speakers. 
Previous research has found that children have difficulty with detecting communicative 
ambiguity when provided with prior information about the intended meaning of a 
statement (e.g., Nilsen et al., 2008; Sodian, 1988). In the present investigation, we found 
that children were able to differentiate between unambiguous and ambiguous speakers 
even when knowledgeable of the intended location. Thus, at some level, children did not 
act purely on their prior knowledge, but attended to the information presented by 
speakers. However, a key difference between past work and the first study is that in 
children in previous studies have had to evaluate clues from the perspective of naive 
listener (i.e., rather than from their own perspective). Thus, to accurately assess the 
knowledge state of another person, children had to suppress their own knowledge. As 
such, the tasks in previous studies (i.e., third person tasks) likely required more cognitive 
demands (e.g., inhibitory control, Nilsen & Graham, in press) than in the present task 
where the same degree of suppression was not required to be successful.  
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Prior knowledge did, however, disrupt children’s ability to differentiate between 
ambiguous and inaccurate speakers. That is, when not informed about the location of the 
dot, children of both ages showed a preference for an ambiguous speaker versus an 
inaccurate speaker (with ratings that matched this preference), suggesting that children 
clearly differentiate these speaker types. However, the children who were informed about 
the location of the dots prior to hearing the speakers’ clues, responded at chance-levels 
when deciding between ambiguous versus inaccurate speakers. Why might this pattern of 
results have emerged? First, for the unknowledgeable children, it is likely that the 
ambiguous speakers were preferred as the clues these speakers provided were the only 
ones that potentially led to a successful outcome (albeit at a 1/3 chance). Conversely, 
when children are provided with prior knowledge, they could rely on this information to 
find the dot, thereby making it more difficult to differentiate between ambiguous and 
inaccurate speakers. However, given that knowledgeable children differentiate between 
unambiguous/ambiguous speakers, this explanation is not entirely sufficient as we found 
that children were not solely relying on prior information.  Thus, a second explanation is 
that it may be the case that when children are knowledgeable of the dot location, they 
develop an expectation for what information the clue will contain. Violations of this 
expectation, whether it is due to ambiguity or inaccuracy, are treated equally as an 
indication of a poor informant, thereby leading to no differentiation between the 
ambiguous and inaccurate speakers.  
Finally, findings provide insight into the relations between implicit and explicit 
appreciation of communicative ambiguity.  In order to assess more implicit measures of 
children’s sensitivity to ambiguity, children’s response latencies were assessed. In 
35 
 
contrast, the speaker proficiency ratings allowed for an analysis of children’s explicit 
evaluations of speaker clarity.  Across both knowledge conditions children took longer to 
respond to ambiguous clues, a finding consistent with previous literature wherein 
preschoolers show nonverbal behaviors that reflect hesitancy to act following ambiguous 
instructions (Patterson, Cosgrove, & O’Brien, 1980). Children’s longer latencies for 
ambiguous clues in the unknowledgeable condition are not surprising given that these 
children did not have enough information (either through prior information or the 
linguistic clue) to adequately hone in on a target location. However, longer latencies 
following ambiguous clues (relative to latencies following unambiguous clues) of 
children who were informed about dot location is suggestive of children’s implicit 
sensitivity to the ambiguity in the message. That is, if children relied solely on the prior 
information, response times would not differ following ambiguous and unambiguous 
clues. While longer search latencies did not relate to children’s decisions about the 
ambiguous speaker in the unknowledgeable condition, they did relate to children’s 
decisions in the knowledgeable condition. When provided with prior information about 
the location of the ‘dot,’ children who took longer to respond to ambiguous clues were 
more likely to rate the ambiguous speaker as less proficient at providing clues. The lack 
of relation between latency and explicit evaluation for children who were not informed 
about the intended location is consistent with previous research. For example, Sekerina 
and colleagues (2004) found that although children’s eye movements following 
ambiguous pronouns showed evidence of ambiguity sensitivity, their explicit responses 
did not.  Such findings suggest that there is incongruence between children’s explicit 
recognition of ambiguity and the degree to which they unconsciously access multiple 
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referential interpretations (Sekerina et al., 2004). However, the finding that implicit 
appreciation of ambiguity was related to explicit speaker ratings in the knowledgeable 
condition suggests a stronger relation between children’s implicit and explicit 
appreciation of ambiguity than has been demonstrated previously (e.g., Nilsen & 
Graham, in press). In this condition, children did not have to rely solely on the clue to 
find the dot. As such, it may be the case that the children who demonstrated rapid search 
times were the ones who relied more on the prior information rather than processing the 
clue itself. Conversely, the children who were taking longer to respond may have 
detected that there was something odd or inadequate about the clue (i.e., as discussed 
above, a violation of expectations). As a result, the slower children responded, the less 
likely they were to rate ambiguous speakers as proficient at providing information.  
The present findings contribute to a growing literature focusing on how children 
selectively acquire information from others. We find that communicative clarity is a cue 
children rely on to assess speakers, however it is one that comes on-line at a later age 
than many of the other cues children rely on (e.g., speaker knowledge, which children as 
young as 24 months rely on; Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Woodward, 2010). While 
much of the previous research has focused on children’s attention to the characteristics of 
the speakers (e.g., age, knowledge, accuracy; Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig et 
al., 2004; Jaswal & Neely, 2006), this work adds to the handful of studies demonstrating 
that children are also sensitive to the process by which information is delivered, that is 
how informants convey information. For example, past research has demonstrated that, 
children prefer speakers who use confident non-verbal cues (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 
2010; Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, & Spellman, 2011) and preschoolers prefer 
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speakers who use expected past tense for words (Jaswal et al., 2008). Here we find that 
communicative clarity/ambiguity also plays a role in children’s evaluations of the 
informant. However, to understand why children in the present study showed an 
avoidance of ambiguous speakers, additional research will be needed. It is clearly a 
useful strategy for children to prefer to acquire information from unambiguous speakers, 
and children’s ratings of the speakers demonstrate that school-age children understand 
that these speakers are more proficient at providing information. However, we do not 
know whether children are making other attributions of the speakers based on their 
communicative clarity. That is, children might view ambiguous speakers as, for example, 
being purposefully tricky or as less informed in some way. It may be that these 
attributions are what drive children’s preferences. The present work operates as a starting 
point in which these further questions can be addressed.  
A limitation of this study was that children were not able to interact with the 
speakers. Videotaped speakers allowed the study to be tightly controlled, however it did 
not allow for insight into children’s ability to detect ambiguity in everyday interactions.  
It is possible that children would pay attention to different aspects of the communication 
process if they were communicating with an individual in person, as opposed to assessing 
individual statements. For example, children might not focus on the clarity of the 
message as their cognitive resources may be taxed by other conversational demands.  
Another limitation is that children’s assessments of message quality took place after 
hearing both adequate and inadequate messages from two different speakers.  It is 
possible that this comparison and delay in message evaluation may have affected 
children’s ability to assess the helpfulness of the messages.  For example, comparing an 
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inadequate speaker to an adequate speaker may highlight the helpfulness of the adequate 
speaker which otherwise may have been ignored.  Future studies could evaluate 
children’s ability to detect ambiguity in a more naturalistic setting.   
A further limitation is that the current study only assessed children’s appreciation 
of communicative ambiguity in terms of a speaker’s ability to provide sufficient 
information to disambiguate amongst referents. While detecting this type of ambiguity is 
a key skill in children’s developing communicative competence, there are a number of 
other ways that communicative ambiguity occurs in our language system. Indeed, our 
language system is inherently ambiguous in that the same words can have very different 
meanings depending on the intentions of the speaker and the contextual backdrop. As 
such, listeners must rely on a number of cues to decipher meaning (e.g., context; tonality; 
facial expression; semantic content of utterance). The present work could be extended by 
assessing the degree to which children use other aspects of communicative ambiguity as a 
cue to determining speaker reliability. For example, assessing whether children are less 
likely to rely on information from speakers who demonstrate incongruent (relative to 
congruent) communicative cues (e.g., discrepancy between a facial expression and either 
tonality or verbal content). Furthermore, the relative salience of communicative 
ambiguity cues compared to other speaker variables could be assessed (e.g., contrasting 
age of speakers or confidence of speakers with communicative clarity) Although not a 
direct test of children’s use of communicative ambiguity as a cue to speakers’ 
communicative competence, the comparison between unambiguous accurate and 
inaccurate speakers (i.e., Unambiguous / Inaccurate comparisons) has implications for the 
speaker reliability literature. Specifically, in previous studies, children who encountered 
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inaccurate speakers (e.g., those who provide an incorrect object label) were aware of the 
inaccuracy at the time the speaker spoke (i.e., children knew the correct label for the 
object). As such, children have a sense of the speaker’s credibility as soon as the verbal 
testimony is provided. In our study, however, children were not aware of the speakers’ 
accuracy until after performing a search. This scenario more closely parallels children’s 
everyday experiences in that, often, children learn novel information without immediately 
knowing about the validity of the speaker’s statement. Children of both ages showed a 
clear preference for the unambiguous accurate speakers, suggesting that children do not 
need to form immediate appraisals of speakers. Rather, judgments about speaker 
reliability can be formed by receiving subsequent information after the speaker’s provide 
their testimony. These findings add to recent work demonstrating that children can track 
speaker’s reliability over time and update their appraisals accordingly (e.g., Schofield & 
Behrend, 2008). 
The ability to communicate and successfully interact with others is an important 
aspect of becoming a well-functioning individual. Detecting communicative ambiguity 
allows children to avoid miscommunication and unsuccessful interactions.  Relevant to 
the present research, children must develop mechanisms that allow them to learn where to 
gain important information.  Children are unable to process all of the new information 
they encounter, therefore they must be able to select what is most relevant and important 
to learn. An efficient way to do so is to determine which individuals are credible sources 
of information.  The current study adds to the growing literature investigating how 
children decide what constitutes a credible source of information by demonstrating that 
communicative ambiguity is an important cue.   
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If, as discussed above, the detection of communicative ambiguity is related to 
children’s executive function skills, it may be the case that clinical populations of 
children who evidence executive difficulties (e.g., children with ADHD or Autism) will 
show difficulties with this important communicative skill. For example, children with 
ADHD have been found to generate less requests for confirmation of understanding 
requests (e.g.,Landau & Milich, 1988) which may indicate that they have difficulty with 
detecting ambiguity. Certainly, other aspects of communication have been related to 
executive dysfunction, including children`s ability to perspective take, pay attention 
during communication and the quality of their vocabulary (Nilsen & Graham, 2009; 
Bishop & Norbury 2005). Further, communicative difficulties have been shown to co-
occur with a number of pediatric psychopathologies (e.g., Pinborough-Zimmerman, 
Satterfield, Miller, Bilder, Hossain,& McMahon, 2007).  As such, future research could 
examine ambiguity detection in clinical populations of children and/or examine whether 
there are negative consequences for disruptions to this skill (e.g., increased responding to 
insufficient information; increased frustration, etc.). 
In conclusion, children show a preference for learning from unambiguous relative 
to ambiguous speakers, highlighting that speaker clarity is an important cue that children 
rely on to selectively acquire information from others. Whereas preschool-age children 
require information regarding the outcome of speaker’s clues, school-age children use 
explicit detection of communicative ambiguity to guide speaker preferences. This 
sensitivity to communicative clarity allows children to hone in on speakers who provide 
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Table 1  
Mean proportion of times children chose speakers (SD) in Study 1  
 Preschool-age children School-age children 
Comparisons Knowledgeable Unknowledgeable Knowledgeable Unknowledgeable 
Ambiguous / Unambiguous     
       Ambiguous .37 (.27) .35 (.31) .29 (.26) .12 (.16) 
       Unambiguous .63 (.27) .65 (.31) .71 (.26) .88 (.16) 
Ambiguous / Inaccurate     
       Ambiguous .49 (.23) .57 (.28) .55 (.24) .70 (.28) 
       Inaccurate .51 (.23)  .43 (.28) .45 (.24)  .30 (.28)  
Inaccurate / Unambiguous      
       Inaccurate .39 (.25) .38 (.30) .36 (.27) .27 (.35) 





Table 2  
Children’s mean ratings of speakers’ proficiency (SD) in Study 1 
 Preschool-age children School-age children 
Comparisons Knowledgeable Unknowledgeable Knowledgeable Unknowledgeable 
Ambiguous / Unambiguous     
       Ambiguous 6.63 (1.77) 7.00 (1.67) 6.41 (1.65) 4.85 (1.79) 
       Unambiguous 7.32 (1.25) 7.43 (1.33) 7.77 (1.15) 7.30 (1.69) 
Ambiguous / Inaccurate     
       Ambiguous 6.63 (1.57) 7.14 (1.28) 6.45 (1.82) 5.60 (1.98) 
       Inaccurate 6.89 (1.45) 5.95 (1.63) 5.81 (1.33) 4.35 (1.39) 
Inaccurate / Unambiguous      
       Inaccurate 6.32 (1.49) 6.14 (2.10) 5.45 (1.57) 4.70 (1.92) 





Mean proportion of times children chose speakers (SD) in Study 2 
Speaker Type Preschool-age children School-age children 
Ambiguous .51 (.30) .36 (.23) 





Children’s mean ratings of speakers’ proficiency (SD) in Study 2 
Speaker Type Preschool-age children School-age children 
Ambiguous 7.32 (1.57) 6.36 (1.36) 





Figure 1. Example of speaker comparison procedures (Unambiguous / Ambiguous 
















You can choose either the girl in the white  
shirt or the girl in the black shirt to help you find the 
sticker. Who do you want to help you?  
Experimenter 





It’s under the 
black one 
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